Decision of whether a Boolean equation system has a solution is an NPC problem and finding a solution is NP hard. In this paper, we present a quantum algorithm to decide whether a Boolean equation system F has a solution and to compute one if F does have solutions with any given success probability. The runtime complexity of the algorithm is polynomial in the size of F and the condition number of F . As a consequence, we give a polynomialtime quantum algorithm for solving Boolean equation systems if their condition numbers are small, say polynomial in the size of F . We apply our quantum algorithm for solving Boolean equations to the cryptanalysis of several important cryptosystems: the stream cipher Trivum, the block cipher AES, the hash function SHA-3/Keccak, and the multivariate public key cryptosystems, and show that they are secure under quantum algebraic attack only if the condition numbers of the corresponding equation systems are large. This leads to a new criterion for designing cryptosystems that can against the attack of quantum computers: their corresponding equation systems must have large condition numbers.
Introduction
As a major advance in quantum algorithm, Harrow, Hassidim, and Lloyd (HHL) proposed a quantum algorithm to solve a linear system Ax = |b with complexity polynomial in log N , s, κ, and 1/ǫ, where N , s, κ are respectively the dimension, the sparseness, the condition number of A, and ǫ is the precision of the output. The HHL algorithm can be exponentially faster than classic algorithms if s and κ are small. Ambainis gave a new version of the HHL algorithm whose complexity is optimal in κ [2] . Childs, Kothari, and Somma gave a new quantum algorithm for linear equation solving, which exponentially improves the dependence on the precision [13] .
In this paper, based on the HHL algorithm, a quantum algorithm for Boolean equation solving will be given with complexity polynomial in the size of the input equation system and the condition number of certain matrix derived from the equation system. Solving Boolean equations is a fundamental problem in theoretical computer science. Decision of whether a Boolean equation system has a solution is an NPC problem and finding a solution is NP hard. Our algorithm can be as much as exponentially faster than traditional algorithms for these NP hard problems under certain conditions.
Main results
Let F = {f 1 , . . . , f r } be a set of Boolean polynomials in variables X = {x 1 , . . . , x n } and with total sparseness T F = r i=1 #f i , where #f i is the number of terms in f i . Then, we have Theorem 1.1. For ǫ ∈ (0, 1), there is a quantum algorithm which decides whether F = 0 has a solution and computes one if F = 0 does have solutions, with probability at least 1 − ǫ and runtime (gate) complexity O((n 3.5 + T 3.5 F )κ 2 log 1/ǫ), where O suppresses more slowly-growing logarithm terms and κ is the condition number of the Boolean polynomial system F (refer to Theorem 5.8 for definition).
As a consequence, we can solve Boolean equation systems using quantum computers with any given success probability and in polynomial-time if the condition number κ of F and the sparseness T F of F are small, say when κ and T F are poly(n). Since T F is the size of the input to the algorithm, it should be small for practical problems. For instance, all the equation systems from cryptanalysis in Section 6 are very sparse. Therefore, the key factor is the condition number. As a consequence, we give a polynomial-time quantum algorithm for solving Boolean equation systems if their condition numbers are small, say the condition numbers are poly(n, T F ).
Let F = {f 1 , . . . , f r } ⊂ C[X] be a set of polynomials with complex numbers as coefficients and with total sparseness T F = r i=1 #f i . A solution a for F = 0 is called Boolean, if each coordinate of a is 0 or 1. Clearly, deciding whether F has a Boolean solution is NPC. We also give a quantum algorithm to compute Boolean solutions of F. Theorem 1.2. For ǫ ∈ (0, 1), there is a quantum algorithm which decides whether F = 0 has a Boolean solution and computes one if F = 0 does have Boolean solutions, with probability at least 1 − ǫ and runtime complexity O(n 2.5 (n + T F )κ 2 log 1/ǫ), where κ is the condition number of the polynomial system F (refer to Theorem 4.3 for definition). Theorem 1.2 is a more basic result. Theorem 1.1 follows from Theorem 1.1 using a novel reduction, and much more problems such as optimization over finite fields [10] can also be efficiently reduced to Theorem 1.2.
We apply Theorem 1.1 to cryptanalysis of several important cryptosystems. As early as in 1946, Shannon [32] pointed out insightfully that "Construct our cipher in such a way that breaking it is equivalent to solving a certain system of simultaneous equations in a large number of unknowns." We know that the analysis of many cryptosystems, such as the stream cipher Trivum, the block cipher AES, the hash function SHA-3/Keccak, and the multivariate public key cryptosystems (MPKC), can be reduced to solving Boolean equations. Note that all these cryptosystems are important. AES is an NIST standard since 2001 [16] , Trivium is an international standard under ISO/IEC 29192-3, and Keccak [6] is the latest member of the Secure Hash Algorithm family of standards, released by NIST in 2015.
In Table 1 , we give the complexities of using Theorem 1.1 to perform quantum algebraic attack to these cryptosystems, where κ is the condition number of the corresponding Boolean equation systems, T is the total sparseness of the Boolean equations, and c is the complexity constant of the Harrow-Hassidim-Lloyd (HHL) algorithm (see Remark 2.4 AES-m, m = 32N k is the key bit-length and N r is the number of rounds. For Trivium, N r is the number of rounds. For Keccak, N h is the output size, N r is the number of rounds, and the state bit-size b is 1600. From Table 1 , we can see that these cryptosystems are secure under quantum algebraic attack only if the condition numbers of their corresponding equation systems are large. This leads to a new criterion for designing cryptosystems that can against the attack of quantum computers: their corresponding equation systems must have large condition numbers. Condition numbers for equation systems are generally difficult to estimate, and estimating the condition numbers for these cryptosystems is an interesting future work.
Many problems from computational theory and cryptography can be reduced to finding a Boolean solution for certain polynomial systems. In this paper, we use Theorem 1.2 to three such problems: the 3-SAT problem, the subset sum problem, and the graph isomorphism problem.
Technical contribution
The main idea of the quantum algorithm proposed in this paper is that the solutions of a Boolean equation system can be obtained by solving a linear system with the HHL quantum algorithm [23] . For a linear system Ax = |b , the HHL algorithm can obtain an approximation to the solution state |x exponentially faster than classic algorithms under certain conditions. Precisely, our algorithm has three main steps:
Step 1 Let F ⊂ C[X] have a finite number of solutions: a 1 , . . . , a w . A pseudo solution of F is defined to be a linear combination of monomial solutions of F, that is, Our contributions here are in three aspects. We propose the concept of complete solving degree and show that for such a degree D, the monomial solutions for F can be obtained from M F ,D m D = b F ,D . We also give a nice upper bound for complete solving degree of the polynomial system occurred in computing the Boolean solutions. It is shown that by using the HHL algorithm to M F ,D m D = b F ,D , we obtain a pseudo solution for F. We gave a modified HHL algorithm to solve the Macaulay linear system, which has better complexities than using the original HHL algorithm.
Second, we show how to compute Boolean solutions for a polynomial system F over C, which are the solutions of F 1 = F ∪ {x 2 1 − x 1 , . . . , x 2 n − x n } over the field of complex numbers. Our contribution here is to show that the solutions of F 1 = 0 can be obtained from the pseudo solutions of F 1 = 0 with high probability by combining the property of quantum states and that of Boolean solutions. The novelty of the approach is that the error bound for the solutions in the HHL algorithm is used to give the probability for finding Boolean solutions of F.
Thirdly, let F be a Boolean polynomial system in variables X. Since the HHL algorithm works over C and does not work for finite fields, we cannot use the HHL algorithm to the Macaulay linear system of F. We prove that the solutions to F are the same as the Boolean solutions of a 6-sparse polynomial system F 2 ⊂ C[X, U] for some extra indeterminates U. Furthermore, the numbers of variables in U and the numbers of equations in F 2 are linear in the size of F. By computing the Boolean solutions of F 2 , we find the solutions of F = 0.
Comparing with existing work
The idea of reducing nonlinear polynomial systems to linear systems of monomials can be traced back to the classical work on resultants [27] , which give conditions for the existence of common solutions for over-determined polynomial systems. Here, a key concept is the solving degree. Precisely, D is a solving degree of polynomial system F, if the Gröbner basis of (F) can be obtained by using Gaussian elimination to the Macaulay linear system M F ,D m D = b F ,D . Lazard [26] and more recently Caminata-Gorla [7] gave nice upper bounds for the solving degree for projective zero dimensional polynomial ideals. The F4 algorithm [18] and the XL [14] algorithm were proposed to compute the Gröbner basis based on this idea. Since the Macaulay linear system for a polynomial system with multiple roots are under-determined, it is not possible to solve the polynomial system by computing values of the monomials directly, unless the equation system has a unique solution. In the general case, extra work need to be done, such as to reduce polynomial system solving to the computation of eigenvalues or solving of univariate equations [15, p51] .
In this paper, we show that the solving degree is not big enough for monomial solving from the Macualay linear system. Instead, we propose the concept of complete solving degree which is enough to for monomial solving from the Macaulay linear system. Furthermore, we show that the Boolean solutions of a polynomial system can be found directly from the solutions of the Macaulay linear system in the quantum case.
Our algorithm is based on the HHL algorithm for solving the linear system Ax = |b , where A ∈ C N ×N , x, b ∈ C N . The speedup achieved in our algorithm is based on the exponential speed up of the HHL algorithm for solving sparse linear systems. On the other hand, the HHL algorithm has the following subtle properties.
1. The algorithm does not give a solution to Ax = |b , but a state |x = (x 1 , . . . , x N ).
Measuring of |x gives |x 1 | : |x 2 | : · · · : |x N | and the complexity will increase to O(N ).
2. The algorithm gives an answer |x even if A|x = |b has no solutions.
3. The algorithm works over C, but not over finite fields.
Our algorithm does not have these limitations and gives an exact solution to the Boolean system. For instance, finding the Boolean solutions to a linear equation with integer coefficients is an NP hard problem (Section 4.3), which can be solved by our algorithm but not the HHL algorithm. So our algorithm can be considered a significant extension of the HHL algorithm.
It is interesting to see that the second "drawbacks" of the HHL algorithm mentioned above is used to generate the quantum state |b efficiently (see Lemma 2.8) for the Macaulay linear system. The HHL algorithm assumes that |b is given. In the general case, there exist no efficient algorithms to generate |b from b [1] and efficient generation for |b can be achieved only in some special cases [9] . Fortunately, in our case, b = b F ,D is very sparse: at most r entries of b are nonzero, which leads to an efficient generation for |b and the complexity is negligible comparing to that of the HHL algorithm.
The complexity of our algorithm contains the condition number of the Boolean polynomial system, which is the condition numbers of the Macaulay matrixes of the polynomial systems and is inherited from the HHL algorithm. It was proved in [23] that the dependence on condition number cannot be substantially improved. More precisely, it was shown that if a quantum algorithm exists for matrix inversion running in time O(κ 1−δ poly(log(N )) for some δ > 0, then BQP =PSPACE [23] . Although the condition numbers of generic polynomial systems are usually exponential, the polynomial systems to be solved in our problems (refer to sections 4.3, 5.3, 6) are highly structural, which are super sparse in most cases and always include the "Boolean equations" x 2 1 −x 1 , . . . , x 2 n −x n . It is expected that new methods are needed to estimate the condition numbers for these polynomial systems.
Previous work on quantum polynomial system solving and algebraic cryptanalysis were mainly based on Grover's algorithm [22] which can achieve quadratic speed-up for exhaust search. The idea of these work are similar: reduce the problem to be solved to a search problem by designing a proper oracle and then use Grover's algorithm. Schwabe-Westerbaan [29] and more recently Faugère et al [19] proposed quantum algorithms for solving Boolean multivariate quadratic polynomial systems (MQ). In particular, a Las-Vegas quantum algorithm for solving Boolean MQ with complexities O(2 0.462n ) was given under certain conditions. On the other hand, the complexity of our algorithm is polynomial in n, the total sparseness, and the condition number. One nice feature of our algorithm is that the complexity depends on the structure of polynomial system and provides faster algorithms for sparse systems with small condition numbers.
In [21] , Grassl et al presented quantum circuits to search the key for AES based on Grover's algorithm. This is possible because, once the keys are given, the polynomial system for AES can be solved easily. For AES-128, 192, and 256, the gates (complexity) used in the circuits are about 2 86 , 2 118 , 2 151 [29] , respectively. Comparing to our result in Table 1 , we have the following observations. The ratio of the complexities of AES-256 to that of AES-128 in Table  1 is 2 5 , while the same ratio for the complexities in [21] is 2 65 . This shows the advantage of the polynomial-time nature of our algorithm: when the key is doubled, the complexity increases little, while for the exponential algorithm in [21] , when the key doubles, the complexity increases exponentially. On the other hand, using Grover's algorithm, the explicit complexities were given in [29] , while our algorithm is much complicated and the complexities in Table 1 contain the parameters c and k.
A modified HHL algorithm
In this section, we give a modified HHL algorithm for solving the linear system Ax = b, where special assumptions about A and b are made. The modified HHL algorithm will be used in our algorithm for solving Boolean equations.
For a matrix A ∈ C M ×N , the arithmetic square root of each nonzero eigenvalue of the matrix A † A is called a singular value of A, and the quotient of the maximal and minimal singular values is called the condition number of A, where A † denotes the complex conjugate transpose of A. A matrix A ∈ C M ×N is called s-sparse if each row and column of A has at most s nonzero entries. We say that the complexity of a query for A is O(γ), if there is an algorithm to find all the nonzero entries in each row or column of A in time O(γ).
The following HHL quantum algorithm [23] was given to solve a linear equation system A|x = |b over C. Theorem 2.1. Suppose that A ∈ C M ×N is an s-sparse matrix and the complexity of a query for A is O(s). Let |b ∈ C M be a unitary quantum state. Then, there is a quantum algorithm which can give an ǫ-approximation to a solution state of the linear system A|x = |b in runtime complexity O(log(M + N )s 2 κ 2 /ǫ), where κ is the condition number of A.
As usual, the notation O suppresses more slowly-growing logarithm terms. With the best known algorithm for Hamiltonian simulation [5] , the complexity of the HHL algorithm can be reduced to O(log(M + N )sκ 2 /ǫ). Ambainis gave a new version of the HHL algorithm which has complexity O(log(M + N )s 2 κ/ǫ 3 ) [2] . Childs-Kothari-Somma gave a new quantum algorithm for linear equation solving, which has complexity O(sκ 2 log(1/ǫ)(log(M + N ) + log 2.5 (1/ǫ))) [13] .
In the rest of this section, we will present a modified version of the HHL algorithm under the following assumptions. We have the following modified HHL algorithm which follows from Lemma 2.9. (4) In the complexity, s 2 is reduced to s, which can also be done with best known algorithm for Hamiltonian simulation [5] , but under the condition that the complexity of a query for A is O(s).
Remark 2.4. In the cryptanalysis to be given later in this paper, we make the following approximation to the complexities of the HHL algorithm O((log(M + N ) + γ)sκ 2 /ǫ) ≃ c(log(M + N ) + γ)sκ 2 /ǫ), where c is called the complexity constant of the HHL algorithm.
For a matrix
, which is a Hermitian matrix. In fact, the HHL algorithm will solve the linear system
We will prove Theorem 2.2 in two steps: first consider the Hamiltonian simulation for e iI(A)t and second consider the preparation for the state |b , where i = √ −1. We need the following result about the quantum complexity for the Hamiltonian simulation.
Lemma 2.5 ([4]
). For a 1-sparseness decomposition A = u j=1 A j of a matrix A ∈ C M ×N and a given time t, we can quantumly simulate e iI(A)t ≃ ( u j=1 e iI(A j )t 0 ) t/t 0 for any small number t 0 by O(log(M + N )(log * (M + N )) 2 ut) =Õ(log(M + N )ut) auxiliary operations and totally O(log * (M + N )ut) queries for the A j s, where log * (n) = min{r | log (r) 2 n < 2} (the (r) indicating the iterated logarithm).
In the following lemma, we modify the HHL algorithm to take into the fact that A already has a 1-sparseness decomposition.
Lemma 2.6. Under Assumption 1, the HHL algorithm gives an ǫ-approximation to a solution state of the linear system Ax = |b in time O((log(M + N ) + γ)sκ 2 /ǫ), where κ is the condition number of A.
Proof. The complexity for the HHL algorithm comes from the Hamiltonian simulation e iI(A)t for time t = κ 2 /ǫ [23] . It is proved that I(A) can be decomposed as the summation of (log * (M + N )s 2 ) 1-sparse matrices. By Lemma 2.5, the complexity for the HHL algorithm is O(log(M + N )s 2 κ 2 /ǫ), where the complexity for the query is negligible [23] .
Under Assumption 1, since I(A) can be decomposed as the summation of s matrices of 1-sparseness, by Lemma 2.5, the complexity for the modified HHL algorithm will decrease to
We need the following detailed information about the HHL algorithm. λ j |u j v j | is the singular value decomposition of A. Then, the HHL algorithm returns an ǫ-approximation to the solution state |x x , where
Furthermore,x has the minimal norm x = x, x among all solutions for Ax = b.
In Lemma 2.6, |b ∈ C M is given as a quantum state and there exist no efficient algorithms to generate |b in the general case [1] . In the rest of this section, we will modify the HHL algorithm such that the input to the HHL algorithm is b instead of |b under Assumption 2. We first prove a lemma.
Lemma 2.8. Let Bx = c be obtained by adding more "equations" 0x = 1 to A|x = |b . Then using HHL to B|x = |c , we obtain the same solution state as that of A|x = |b . In the following lemma, we modify the HHL algorithm to take into the fact that b contains ρ nonzero entries. . . , 2 σ − 1. Correspondingly, by adding (2 σ − ρ)2 v zero rows to A before the ρ2 v -th row of A, we obtain a matrix B ∈ C ((r+2 σ −ρ)2 v )×N . Note that adding some zero rows will not increase the sparseness and the complexity of a query for a matrix. Then the equation system Ax = b becomes
We may add more zero rows at the ends of B and c such that B ∈ C 2 η ×N and c ∈ C 2 η , where
With these assumptions, we can easily generate the state |c :
is the Hadamard operator. The complexity of generating |c is O(η)
where C = B 2 σ/2 . We show that C satisfies Assumption 1. It is clear that C can be written as the summation of s 1-sparse matrices C j . The complexity of a query for C j is the same as that of A j , because the (u, v)-th element of C is the (u, v)-th element of B divided by 2 σ/2 , in other words, we do not need to actually generate the matrix C.
By Lemma 2.8, equation system (3) has the same solution state as that of A|x = |b , when using the HHL algorithm to them. As mentioned before, the HHL algorithm actually solves I(C)(0, x) T = (c, 0) T . Similar to the above procedure, we can add more zeros to the end of (c, 0) T to obtain a state, which costs at most O(log(2 η + N )) = O(log(M + N )).
By Lemma 2.6, the total complexity is the complexity of using the HHL algorithm to (3) plus that of generating |c , that is,
Remark 2.10. If γ is small, say γ = O(log(M + N )), then the complexity of the modified HHL algorithm is O((log(M + N ) + γ)sκ 2 /ǫ) = O(log(M + N )sκ 2 /ǫ). Fortunately, the linear system to be solved in Section 3 has this property.
3 Quantum monomial-solving of polynomial systems over C In this section, we give a quantum algorithm to find the a solution for the monomials of a polynomial system F, which satisfy a linear system.
The Macaulay linear system
In this section, we will construct a Macaulay linear system for a finite set of polynomials and show that the linear system satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2 given in Section 2.
Let C be the field of complex numbers and C[X] the polynomial ring in the indeterminates X = {x 1 , . . . , x n }. For a polynomial f ∈ C[X], denote deg(f ), #f , and m(f ) to be the total degree of f , the sparseness (the number of terms) of f , and the set of monomials of f . For S ⊂ C[X], we use V C (S) ⊂ C n to denote the common zeros of the polynomials in S.
Let m denote the set of all the monomials in variables X. In this section, we will use the lexicographic monomial ordering for x 1 > · · · > x n . For convenience, we denote 0 = (0, 0, . . . , 0), 1 = (1, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ C n , and
For a given positive integer d, let m ≤d be the set of all monomials which are factors of
In the rest of Section 3, let
) and t i = #f i for i = 1, . . . , r. We first define several parameters.
Definition 3.1. Without loss of generality, we may assume f i (0) = −1 for i = 1, . . . ρ and
Remark 3.2. In this paper, the subscripts for a matrix or a vector always start from 0, because, the complexity analysis of the algorithm in this paper depends on the representation of the subscripts. In order to write these functions precisely, introduce the following new notation:
for i = 1, . . . , r and j = 0, . . . , (d + 1) n − 1. We rewrite md ,j,i f i for i = 1, . . . , r and j = 1, . . . , (d + 1) n − 1 in matrix form:
where
Then
called the modified Macaulay matrix of the polynomial system F and (6) is called the Macaulay
Remark 3.3. The columns corresponding to monomial mD ,j with deg(mD ,j ) > D are all 0 columns.
Remark 3.4. The zero rows are added so that the modified Macaulay matrix can be efficiently queried. Refer to Lemma 3.10 for details. 
In the rest of this section, we will prove the following main result of this section, which follows from Lemmas 3.7, 3.8, and 3.10. 
For nonnegative integers B > 1 and k < B n , we denote k (B) = (k n−1 , . . . , k 0 ), where
The following simple fact is crucial in the complexity analysis of our algorithm: the k-th element in m ≤d is
where k (d+1) = (k n−1 , . . . , k 0 ). Equation (7) is true under the assumption made in Remark 3.2.
Proof. From Definition 3.1 ofd andD, we haved
where each M ij is a 1-sparse {0, 1}-matrix. In fact, only the
Proof. We can treat the coefficients c ij of f i as new indeterminates and then write M F ,D as a function in c ij . The coefficient of c ij is M ij . Since c ij X α ij is a term of f i , only md ,k f i contains terms whose coefficient are c ij , which corresponds to the
The 1-sparseness of M ij comes from the fact that the rows and columns of the nonzero entries are distinct.
As a direct consequence, we have
Lemma 3.10. The complexity of a query for M ij is O(n log(D)+log r), where M ij is introduced in Lemma 3.8.
Proof. Given a row index i 0 , we want to know the nonzero entry in the i 0 -th row. By Lemma 3.8, the i 0 -th row has a nonzero entry if and only
Compute the quotient l and remainder k such that i 0 = (d + 1) n l + k. By Lemma 3.8, the i 0 -th row has a nonzero entry if and only if l = i − 1 and
We now analyse the complexity of the above step. Without loss of generality, we assume that all the numbers are represented in binary form, which is crucial to the complexity. Sincē d + 1 = 2 δ is a power of 2, we can compute (d + 1) n = 2 δn easily in time O(log(n) log(log(d))). We can check
. Since all numbers are binary, the last δn bits of i 0 are exactly the remainder k, and other bits are the quotient l. As a result, we can compute both l and k in time O(log(n) log(log(d))). Since the number of bits for i 0 is O(log i 0 ) = O(log(r(d+ 1) n ) = O(log r + n logd), the complexity is bounded by O(log r + n logd). Since both d+1 = 2 δ andD+1 = 2 ∆ are powers of 2 and k is in binary form, we can insert (∆−δ) zeros before each δ bits of k starting from lower digits to obtain (
On the other hand, given a column index j 0 , we want to know the nonzero entries in the j 0 -th column. Compute k = (j 0 ) (D+1) − α ij first. If k is a nonnegative vector, we can compute k (d+1) . By Lemma 3.8, only if
th entry is the unique nonzero entry in the j 0 -th column. Else the j 0 -th column is a 0 column. Similarly, the complexity is O(n log(D) + log r).
Complete solving degree for a polynomial system
In this section, we show how to determine a D such that the monomials of a polynomial system F can be solved from the Macaulay linear system M F ,D m D = b F ,D by introducing the concept of complete solving degree. We first define the concept of solving degree [26, 7] , which is an important concept for polynomial system solving. Definition 3.11. Let F = {f 1 , . . . , f r } ⊂ C[X] and (F) the ideal generated by F. Let G be the reduced Gröbner basis of the ideal (F) under the degree reverse lexicographic (DRL) monomial ordering. D is called the solving degree of F, if D is the minimal integer such that for any
Denote the solving degree of F by Sdeg(F).
In terms of the F4 algorithm [18] or the XL algorithm [14] , D is the solving degree of F, if the Gröbner basis of the ideal (F) can be obtained from M F ,D m D = b F ,D by using Gaussian elimination over C.
We have the following upper bound for the solving degree.
The following example shows that the solving degree is not large enough for monomial solving with the Macaulay linear system.
The residue monomials of (F) with respect to G is {1, x 3 }. Let D = 3, we want to solve the monomials of degrees ≤ D from the Macaulay linear system M F ,D m D = b F ,D , or more precisely, we want to written all monomials of degrees ≤ 3 as expressions of x 3 . After doing Gaussian elimination to the Macaulay system, the nontrivial polynomials are:
We can see that each monomial of degree ≤ 3 is solved in terms of x 3 , x 1 x 3 , and x 2 x 3 , which means that the Macaulay linear system does not give the "correct" solution to the monomials and the monomials x 1 x 3 and x 2 x 3 are not solved in terms of x 3 .
Motivated by the above example, we introduce the concept of complete solving degree. Definition 3.14. Let F = {f 1 , . . . , f r } ⊂ C[X] and (F) the ideal generated by F. Let G be the reduced Gröbner basis of the ideal (F) under the DRL monomial ordering. D is called the complete solving degree of F, if D is the minimal integer such that for any polynomial g ∈ G and
Denote the complete solving degree of F by CSdeg(F).
Example 3.15. For the F given in Example 3.13, we have CSdeg(F) = 4. For D = 4, after doing Gaussian elimination to the Macaulay linear system, we obtain
Note that all monomials with degree ≤ 4 are written as expressions of the residue monomials 1, x 3 . In other words, the monomials are solved with the Macaulay system for D = 4.
In this paper, we will consider polynomial systems of the following form
where lm(f i ) is the largest monomial of f i under the DRL monomial ordering, also called the leading monomial of f i . We will give upper bounds for the solving degree and complete solving degree for a polynomial system of form (9) in the following lemmas. Note that the proofs of these results do not depend on the results in [26, 7] .
Proof. By the Hilbert function, it is easy to see that (F 2 ) is zero-dimensional and hence (F) is zero-dimensional. Let I = (F) and G the reduced Gröbner basis for (F) under the DRL monomial ordering. Denote lm(I) to be the set of the leading monomials of the polynomials in I. Since x
If b j is not reduced by some f i , we have b j = pf i + q where q is reduced by f i and h = (
As a consequence, we can assume that each b j is reduced by F 2 and hence deg(
, it is easy to see that F 2 is a Gröbner basis for (F 2 ). Then, there existã 1 , . . . ,ã n such thath =
where the last equation comes from the assumption d i ≥ 1.
Proof. Let I = (F) and
There exists a g in the reduced Gröbner basis G of (F), such that lm(g)|m. 
. Then g ∈ I and deg(lm( g)) < D. We thus can repeat the above procedure for g (instead of mg). The process will end and we obtain g = mg −
Since lm( g) ∈ lm(I) and g ∈ I, we have g = 0 and hence mg = n i=1 p i f i + r j=1 q j g j . The lemma is proved.
Solution of the Macaulay linear system
The following lemma gives the solutions to the Macaulay linear system (5) by using the complete solving degree. 
When we do Gaussian elimination on the linear system (a 1 ) = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) . By Lemma 3.18, the solution of the Macaulay linear system is (1,
A quantum algorithm for monomial-solving of polynomial systems
In this section, we show that applying the HHL algorithm to the Macaulay linear system of F, we obtain a pseudo solution of F. Note that a pseudo solution of F is a solution of the Macualay linear system. From Lemma 3.18, the converse is not rue: a solution of the Macaulay linear system contains some arbitrary constants µ k and is not a pseudo solution of F. Fortunately, applying the HHL algorithm to the Macaulay linear system, the solution of the Macualay linear system is a pseudo solution of F.
We introduce the notation m ∈ m (D+1) n −1 : for k = 1, . . . , (D + 1) n − 1,
Using the modified HHL algorithm (Theorem 2.2) to the Macaulay linear system, we have 
By Lemma 2.7, m D is minimal. Since e k−1 | m D (a i ) = 0, in order for m D to be minimized, each µ k = 0. We proved that the solution is indeed a pseudo solution.
We now analyse the complexity. We may change the order of f i such that, the first ρ polynomials f i have nonzero constant terms. This step costs O(r). By Lemma 3. 
We prove the theorem.
By Remark 2.4, the exact complexity for Theorem 3.21 is Example 3.24. If using the modified HHL algorithm to solve the linear system in Example 3.5, by Theorem 3.21, the solution is (1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) . In order to find the unique solution x 1 = 1, x 2 = 1, we need to know how to project (
Motivated by the above example, we propose the following problem.
Problem 3.25. Let |u be an N -dimensional quantum state and n ≪ N . How can we measure n selected coordinates of |u efficiently.
Find Boolean solutions for polynomial systems in C[X]
In this section, we will give a quantum algorithm to compute the Boolean solutions of a polynomial system F over C. The key idea is that by measuring the pseudo solutions of F, we may obtain a Boolean solution of F with high probability.
A quantum algorithm to find Boolean solutions
A solution a for F ⊂ C[X] is called Boolean, if each coordinate of a is 0 or 1. For F ⊂ C[X], the set of Boolean solutions of F are denoted as V B (F). We first prove a lemma.
Proof. The first assertion is easy. Since (F B ) + (x 1 − a 1 , . . . , x n − a n ) is a maximal ideal in the ring
is an intersection of maximal ideals and I is a radical ideal. F B ∪ H X is clearly of form (9) . By Lemma 3.17, CSdeg( Output: A Boolean solution a ∈ V C (F, H X ) or ∅ meaning that V C (F, H X ) = ∅, with success probability at least 1 − ǫ.
Step 1: If F(0) = 0, return 0. If F(1) = 0, return 1. Set l = 1.
Step 2: Let F 1 = F B and Y = X.
Step 3:
Step 4: Use the modified HHL algorithm (Theorem 2. Step 5: Measuring | m D , we obtain a state |e k−1 which corresponds mD ,k in m D .
Step 6:
Step 7: Remove 0 from
Step 8: If 1 ∈ F 1 or Y = ∅ then goto Step 11
Step 9: If F 1 = ∅ and F 1 (0) = 0, then goto Step 3.
Step 10: Return (a 1 , . . . , a n ) where a i = 0 if x i ∈ Y else a i = 1.
Step 11: If l > ⌈log ǫ 1 ǫ⌉ then return ∅, else l = l + 1 and goto Step 2.
We have the following theorem, which will be proved in the rest of this section.
Theorem 4.3. Algorithm 4.2 has the following properties.
1. If the algorithm returns a solution, then it is a Boolean solution of F = 0. Equivalently, if F has no Boolean solutions, the algorithm returns ∅.
2. If F has Boolean solutions, the algorithm computes one with probability at least 1 − ǫ.
3. The runtime complexity of the algorithm is O(n 2.5 (n + T F )κ 2 log 1/ǫ), where κ is the maximal condition number for all matrixes M F 2 ,D in Step 4 of the algorithm, called the condition number for the polynomial system F.
First, we briefly explain Algorithm 4.2. The algorithm has two loops: the inner loop from Step 3 to Step 9 and the outer loop from Step 2 to Step 11.
In the inner loop, we try to find a solution a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) of F 1 and in each run of the loop at least one coordinate of a whose value is 1, say a k = 1, is found. Then, we set x k = 1 and try to find the rest coordinates of a in the rest of the loop. If the inner loop fails, then we restart from Step 2 and try to find another solution.
The purpose of the outer loop is two folds. First, by using precision
Step 4, the algorithm uses less qubits. We can use a large value for ǫ 1 ∈ (0, 1), say ǫ 1 = 1/2. Then the precision needed in Step 4 is
which is generally larger than ǫ n . Second, the complexity of the algorithm related with the precision decreases from O(1/ √ ǫ) to O(log 1/ǫ).
The reason is the algorithm runs ⌈log ǫ 1 ǫ⌉ more times of the inner loop but with less precision
n . Please refer to Lemma 4.7 for the detailed analysis. We will explain each step of the algorithm below. In Step 1, we first check two easy solutions. In Step 2, since x 2 i − x i = 0, we replace x m i by x i in time O(nT F ) to obtain F B . In the inner loop from step 3 to step 9, we will try to find a solution a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) of F 1 . In Step 3, the bound D = 3#Y for the completely solving degree can be used due to Lemma 4.1. In Step 4, we use the modified HHL to solve the Macaulay linear system.
In Step 5, we measure the quantum state
Then by the property of quantum measurement, with probability | mD ,k | 2 , the measurement returns |e k−1 (By Remark 3.2, the subscript starts at 0).
In
Step 6, we will show later that with high provability mD ,k = u k i=1 x n i = 0 at the solution a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) to be found. Since a i is either 0 or 1, u k i=1 a n i = 0 implies a n i = 1 for all n i . We thus set x n i = 1 in Step 7 and try to find the other coordinates of a in the loop from Step 3 to Step 9.
In Step 8, either 1 ∈ F 1 or Y = ∅ implies V C (F 1 , H Y ) = ∅, because we have both F(0) = 0 and F(1) = 0 from step 1. This means that we did not find a solution in the loop from Step 3 to Step 9 and need to find another solution by starting from Step 2 again.
Step 9, if F 1 = ∅ or F 1 (0) = 0, then we find a solution of F: x i = 0 for any x i ∈ Y and x j = 1 for any x j ∈ Y, which will be returned in Step 10. The following key lemma gives the successful probability for Steps 5 and 6. Lemma 4.4. In Steps 5 and 6, with a probability > 1 − ǫ 1 /n, V C (F 2 ) = ∅ implies that there exists an a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ V C (F 2 ) with a n i = 1 for i = 1, . . . , u k . Measuring | m D may lead a wrong |e k−1 , that is, α k = 0 but β k = 0. By the definition of quantum measurement, the probability for this wrong case to happen is j,α j =0 β j |e j−1
Proof. Let |m
words, if the HHL algorithm returns |e k−1 , then with probability > 1 − ǫ 1 /n, the measurement returns a correct |e k−1 meaning α k = 0.
By Theorem 3.21, the HHL algorithm returns
η a mD ,k (a). The condition α k = 0 implies that there exists a solution a ∈ V C (F 2 ) such that mD ,k (a) = 0. Since a is a Boolean solution, we have mD ,k (a) = 1. The lemma is proved.
We now compute the successful probability for the inner loop.
Lemma 4.5. The loop from
Step 3 to Step 9 will run at most n times, and returns ∅ with probability < ǫ 1 when F = 0 has Boolean solutions.
Proof. Since at each loop, the values of at least one x i will be determined in Step 6, we will repeat this loop for at most n times. By Lemma 4.4, when F = 0 has Boolean solutions, the algorithm returns ∅ with probability
We now compute the successful probability for the algorithm.
Lemma 4.6. The loop from Step 2 to Step 11 will run at most ⌈log ǫ 1 ǫ⌉ times and with probability ≥ 1 − ǫ, returns a Boolean solution of F = 0 when F = 0 has Boolean solutions.
Proof. By Lemma 4.5, if F has Boolean solutions, then the probability that we reach step 11 is < ǫ 1 . The number of loops from Step 2 to
Step 11 is at most ⌈log ǫ 1 ǫ⌉. Then, if F has Boolean solutions, then the probability that the algorithm returns ∅ is ǫ
Finally, we estimate the runtime complexity of Algorithm 4.2.
Lemma 4.7. The complexity for Algorithm 4.2 is √ 2c(n log 2 (6n + 1) + log 2 (r + 1))n 1.5 (n + 1 + T F )κ 2 ⌈log 2 1/ǫ⌉. Moreover, it equals to O(n 2.5 (n + T F )κ 2 log 1/ǫ).
Proof.
Step 4 is the dominate step in terms of complexities. The complexities for other steps are very low comparing to that of Step 4. So, we just omit them from the complexity analysis. By Lemma 4.5, the loop from Step 3 to Step 9 will run at most n times. Then the complexity for the loop from Step 3 to Step 9 is n−1 j=0 (c log(r(d+1) n +(D+1) n −1)(2(n−j)+T F )κ 2 n/ǫ 1 ) ≤ c log(r(d + 1) n + (D + 1) n − 1)(n(n + 1) + nT F )κ 2 n/ǫ 1 .
By Lemma 4.6, the loop from Step 2 to Step 11 will run at most ⌈log ǫ 1 ǫ⌉ times. Then the total complexity of the algorithm is c log(r(d + 1) n + (D + 1) n − 1)(n(n + 1) + nT F )κ 2 n/ǫ 1 ⌈log ǫ 1 ǫ⌉ = c log(r(d + 1) n + (D + 1) n − 1)n 1.5 (n + 1 + T F )κ 2 √ 2⌈log 2 1/ǫ⌉, by choosing ǫ 1 to be 1/2.
Since r(d + 1) n + (D + 1) n − 1 ≤ (r + 1)(D + 1) n , we have log(r(d + 1) n + (D + 1) n − 1) ≤ log(r + 1) + n log(D + 1) ≤ log(r + 1) + n log(2D + 1) ≤ log(r + 1) + n log(6n + 1) by Lemma 3.7 (D + 1 ≤ 2D + 1) and 4.1 (D ≤ 3n).
The totally complexity for Algorithm 4.2 is at most √ 2c(n log 2 (6n + 1) + log 2 (r + 1))n 1.5 (n + 1+T F )κ 2 ⌈log 2 1/ǫ⌉ = O((n+log(r))n 1.5 (n+T F )κ 2 log 1/ǫ) = O(n 2.5 (n+T F )κ 2 log 1/ǫ), because r ≤ T F .
We have completed the proof of Theorem 4.3. We can easily improve our algorithm as follows.
Remark 4.8. Given (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ C n , F ⊂ C[X], we can obtain an element in V C (F,
n −a n x n ) by Algorithm 4.2, where we need to replace H X with (x 2 1 −a 1 x 1 , . . . , x 2 n −a n x n ) and x n i = 1 with x n i = a n i in Step 6.
Remark 4.9. Algorithm 4.2 has complexity O(n 3.5 (n + T F )κ log 1/ǫ) if using Ambainis' algorithm [2] to solve the Macaulay linear system.
Obtain all the Boolean solutions
We will show how to find all Booelan solutions of F. For a Boolean solution a of F, the following lemma shows how to construct a polynomial system For a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ V C (F, H X ), we have
Then we can use the Algorithm 4.2 to find all Boolean Solutions for F = 0. Algorithm 4.11.
Step 1:
Step 2: Use Algorithm 4.2 to compute Boolean solutions of F 1 = 0. If we obtain ∅, return S.
Else we obtain a Boolean solution a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ).
Step 3: S = S ∪ {a},
Step 2.
Theorem 4.12. Let w = #V C (F, H X ). Then Algorithm 4.11 finds w Boolean solutions of F = 0 with complexity O(n 2.5 (n + T F + w)wκ 2 log 1/ǫ), and probability at least (1 − ǫ) w .
Proof. By Theorem 4.3, the complexity of the algorithm is w−1 i=0 O((2n) 2.5 (2n + 3n + T F + i)κ 2 log 1/ǫ) = O(n 2.5 (n + T F + w)wκ 2 log 1/ǫ).
Computing Boolean solutions to linear systems and applications
Many well-known problems in computation theory and cryptography can be described as finding the Boolean solutions for linear systems over C. In this section, we consider two such problems and their computational complexities using our quantum algorithm.
The subset sum problem is an important problem in complexity theory and cryptography. The problem is: given a set of integers, is there a non-empty subset whose sum is a given number? The problem can be described as finding the Boolean solutions for a linear system. We have the following result. Proposition 4.13. Let A ∈ Z r×n for r < n and b ∈ Z r . There is a quantum algorithm to find a Boolean solution to the linear system Ax = b with probability ≥ 1 − ǫ and complexity O(n 3.5 rκ 2 log 1/ǫ) Proof. We have r linear equation of sparseness (n + 1) and n quadratic binomials. Thus T = 2n + nr + r, and by Theorem 4.3, we can use Algorithm 4.2 to find a Boolean solution for Ax = b in time O(n 2.5 (n + 2n + nr + r)κ 2 log 1/ǫ) = O(n 3.5 rκ 2 log 1/ǫ).
The graph isomorphism problem is another well-known problem in computational theory, which is to determine whether two finite graphs are isomorphic. We do not know whether it is NPC or P. The problem can be described as solving the Boolean solutions for a linear system. Let A and B in F n×n 2 be the adjacent matrices for two graphs, the graph isomorphism problem is to decide whether there exists a permutation matrix P such that AP = P B.
Proposition 4.14. There is a quantum algorithm to decide whether two graphs with n vertices are isomorphic with probability ≥ 1 − ǫ and complexity O(n 6.5 κ 2 log 1/ǫ).
Proof. Let A = (a ij ), B = (b ij ), P = (x ij ) with i x ij = 1 for each j, j x ij = 1 for each i, and x 2 ij − x ij = 0 for each i, j. Thus in the equation system, the number of 2n-sparse linear equations is n 2 , the number of (n + 1)-sparse linear equations is 2n, and the number of quadratic binomials is n 2 . Thus T = 2n 3 + 4n 2 + 2n, by Theorem 4.3, we can use Algorithm 4.2 to find a Boolean solution for AP = P B in time O((n 2 ) 2.5 (n 2 + 2n 3 + 4n 2 + 2n)κ 2 log 1/ǫ) = O(n 8 κ 2 log 1/ǫ).
Due to the special property of the problem, the complexity could be reduced as follows. Considering the loop from Step 3 to Step 9 in Algorithm 4.2, since exactly n of x ij equal to 1 in the permutation matrix P , the number of loops will be n instead of n 2 . Thus the error bound in step 4 will be ǫ 1 /n instead of ǫ 1 /n 2 . Finally, we can use Algorithm 4.2 to find a Boolean solution for AP = P B in time O(n 8−1.5 κ 2 log 1/ǫ) = O(n 6.5 κ 2 log 1/ǫ).
By Propositions 4.13 and 4.14, in order to determine the quantum complexity of these two problems, we need only to study the condition numbers of the corresponding equation systems.
Solving Boolean equation systems
In this section, we will give a quantum algorithm to solve Boolean equations by converting the problem into that of computing the Boolean solutions for a 6-sparse polynomial system over C.
Reduce Boolean systems to polynomial systems over C
Let F 2 be the field consisting of 0 and 1. We will consider the problem of equation solving over F 2 , or equivalently, solving Boolean equations. Let X = {x 1 , . . . , x n } be a set of indeterminants and
is a Boolean ring and every ideal in R 2 is radical. Elements in R 2 are called Boolean polynomials, which have the form i m i and m i are Boolean monomials with degree at most one for each x i . Similar to Section 3, we use V F 2 (F) to denote the zeros of F ⊂ R 2 [X] in F 2 .
The following example shows that we cannot use a method of equation solving over C to solve Boolean equations directly.
The following lemma shows how to reduce Boolean equation solving to equation solving over C.
Lemma 5.2. Let F = {f 1 , . . . , f r } be a set of Boolean polynomials with
k=1 m ik and a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ V F 2 (F). When we regard f i as a polynomial in Note that #C(f i ) increases exponentially in terms of t i . In order to obtain sparse polynomials, we split each f i into several s-sparse Boolean polynomials for a given s ∈ N ≥3 . Let f = t i=1 m i be a Boolean polynomial. Set S t = ⌈ t−s s−2 ⌉ and U f = {u 1 , . . . , u St } be a set of new variables depending on f . We define a Boolean polynomial set S(f, s) as follows. If t ≤ s, then S(f, s) = {f } and U f = ∅. Otherwise, let 
The following results are easy to check.
. For a given s ∈ N ≥3 , we have
where (S (F, s) ) is the ideal generated by
We summarize the results of this subsection as the following theorem which follows from Lemmas 5.3 and 5.2. (F, s) . Then we have a polynomial set
In our algorithm, we use s = 3. For a Boolean polynomial f with #f ≤ 3, we give the following improved version of C(f ).
if #f = 2 and f = n 1 + n 2 ; f − 2, if #f = 3 and f (0) = 1; 2m 1 m 2 + 2m 1 m 3 + 2m 2 m 3 − f if #f = 3 and f (0) = 0, (14) where f = m 1 + m 2 + m 3 in the case #f = 3. For this new C(f ), we have
Proof. We need only to show the last case in (14) and other results are easy to verify. Since we consider Boolean solutions, we may set m 2 = m for any monomial m. Then, C(
If t i ≥ 3 for all i, by Lemma 5.3, we have #S(F, 3) = T F −2r and #(X∪U(F, 3)) = n+T F −3r, where
Hence the bounds are still true.
Quantum algorithm for Boolean equation solving
In this subsection, we will give a quantum algorithm to solve Boolean equations. Output: A zero of F or ∅ meaning that V F 2 (F) = ∅ with probability > 1 − ǫ.
Step 1: (13), where Y = X ∪ U(F, 3).
Step 2:
as defined in (14) .
Step 3: Use Algorithm 4.2 to find a Boolean solution of F 2 = 0 over C [Y] , with the probability bound ǫ. Return ∅ if Algorithm 4.2 returns ∅, else we have a Boolean solution a for F 2 .
Step 4: Return Proj X a.
Theorem 5.8. Algorithm 5.7 has the following properties.
• If the algorithm returns a solution, then it is a solution of F = 0. Equivalently, if V F 2 (F) = ∅, the algorithm returns ∅.
• If V F 2 (F) = ∅, the algorithm computes a solution of F = 0 with probability > 1 − ǫ.
• The runtime complexity is O((n 3.5 + T 3.5 F )κ 2 log 1/ǫ), where T F = i #f i and κ is the condition number of the polynomial system F 2 , called the condition number of the Booolean system F.
Proof. In Step 2, we split F to 3-sparse polynomials and then turn them into a polynomial system over C in time O(T F ). By Corollary 5.6, V F 2 (F) = V B (F 2 ). Thus, we need only to find Boolean solutions for F 2 in Step 3.
If we use
Step 1, by Theorems 4.3 and 5.5, the complexity of Step 3 is O((n+ i ⌈
To minimize this complexity, we choose s = 3, meanwhile the complexity is
Remark 5.9. Algorithm 5.7 has complexity O((n 4.5 + T 4.5 F )κ log 1/ǫ) if using Ambainis' algorithm [2] to solve the Macualay linear systems.
The following theorem gives the exact complexity for solving Boolean equations, which will be used in Section 6. 2c((n + T F − 3r + 2r 1 + r 2 ) log 2 (6(n + T F − 3r + 2r 1 + r 2 ) + 1) + log 2 (T F − 2r + 2r 1 + r 2 + 1))(n + T F − 3r + 2r 1 + r 2 ) 1.5 ((n + T F − 3r + 2r 1 + r 2 ) + 1 + (6T F − 12r + 7r 1 + 2r 2 ))κ 2 ⌈log 2 1/ǫ⌉ ≤ √ 2c(log 2 (n + T F ) + 3)(n + T F ) 2.5 (n + 7T F )κ 2 ⌈log 2 1/ǫ⌉, where c is the complexity constant of the HHL algorithm defined in Remark 2.4.
Proof. We use C(f ) defined in (14) . By Corollary 5.6, C(S (F, 3) ) consists of r 1 monomials, r 2 binomials, and t s=3 ((s − 2)r s ) = T F − 2r + r 1 polynomials of sparseness 6, and the number of indeterminates is n + t s=3 ((s − 3)r s ) = n + T F − 3r + 2r 1 + r 2 . Thus the total sparseness for P = C(S (F, 3) ) is T P = r 1 + 2r 2 + 6(T F − 2r + r 1 ) = 6T F − 12r + 7r 1 + 2r 2 . By Lemma 4.7, the exact complexity for Algorithm 5.7 to find a solution is
Application to 3-satisfiability problem
Let X = {x 1 , . . . , x n } be Boolean indeterminates. A 3-SAT problem is to check the satisfiability of the propositional logic formula y i1 ∨ y i2 ∨ y i3 = 1 for i = 1, . . . , r, where y ij = x k or ¬x k for some k. Decision of 3-SAT is NPC. The 3-SAT problem is equivalent to solve the Boolean equation system
, where X = {x 1 , . . . ,x n }.
Proposition 5.11. For a 3-SAT with r clauses, there is a quantum algorithm to decide its satisfiability with probability ≥ 1 − ǫ and with complexity O((n 2.5 (n + r)κ 2 log 1/ǫ).
Proof. It is easy to see that solving the Boolean system F is equivalent to find the Boolean solutions for the following polynomial system in C[X, X],
that is, the 3-SAT problem is satisfiable if and only if V C (F) = ∅. Also note that x +x − 1 = 0 and x 2 − x = 0 implyx 2 −x = 0. F 1 consists of n binomials, n trinomials and r monomials. Thus T F 1 = 5n + r, by Lemma 4.7, we can use Algorithm 4.2 to find a Boolean solution in time O(n 2.5 (n + 5n + r)κ 2 log 1/ǫ) = O(n 2.5 (n + r)κ 2 log 1/ǫ).
The best classic probabilistic algorithm for 3-SAT was 1.334 n given in [30] . In order for our quantum algorithm to perform better n should be ≥ 64, if κ is not too big.
Solving Boolean quadratic equations and cryptanalysis
Cryptanalysis of stream ciphers, block ciphers, certain hash functions, and MPKC can be reduced to the solving of Boolean multivariate quadratic equations (BMQ). In this section, we will apply our quantum algorithm to the analysis of these cryptosystems.
Quantum algebraic attack against AES
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), also known by its original name Rijndael, is a specification for the encryption of electronic data established by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology in 2001 [16] .
Murphy and Robshaw [28] proposed a method to construct a Boolean equation system, solving of which consists of an algebraic attack against AES. We will use this approach to establish a BMQ.
Denote the 32-bit key length of AES as N k and the number of rounds as N r . Denote p, c ∈ F
as the plaintext and the ciphertext of AES,
as the key of AES,
as the expanded key of AES,w i ∈ F 4N k ×8 2 as the image of w i under the S-box map in the key expansion step,
as the state after the AddRoundKey step of AES, and
as the state after the InvSubBytes step of AES, where x i (j, m) means the m-th bit at the j-th word of state x for round i. In the key expansion step, several statesw i are obtained as the image of w i under the S-box. Then, an algebraic attack on the N r -rounds AES with key length N k is to solve the following BMQ, denoted as AES-(N k , N r ): For N k ≤ 6 :
For N k > 6 : The equation set S of the S-box is given in the Appendix (Section 8), which can be simplified as follows. The original S is a BMQ with total sparseness 1688. By doing Gaussian elimination, we obtain a BMQ S with with total sparseness 1192. We can introduce 1075 new indeterminates u ij to split S into 3-sparse BMQ. Thus P (S, 3) consists of 1331 quadratic binomials, 115 quadratic polynomials, 989 cubic polynomials, and 10 quartic polynomials over C.
Totally, the AES-(N k , N r ) can be represented by a BMQ with number of indeterminates
. By Theorem 5.10, we have Proposition 6.1. There is a quantum algorithm to obtain a solution of AES-(N k , N r ) with complexity
with probability > 1 − ǫ, where κ is the condition number of F and c is the complexity constant of the HHL algorithm.
Set N k = 4, 6, 8, N r = 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, and ǫ = 1%. We have the following complexities on quantum algebraic attack on various AESes. From Table 2 , we can see that AES is secure under quantum algebraic attack only if the condition number κ is large.
Quantum algebraic attack against Trivium
Trivium is a synchronous stream cipher designed by Canniére and Preneel [8] r cκ 2 log 1/ǫ with probability > 1 − ǫ, where κ is the condition number of F and c is the complexity constant of the HHL algorithm.
Proof. By Theorem 5.10, the complexity is √ 2c(log 2 ((3N r +87)+(22N r −1005))+3)((3N r +87)+ (22N r − 1005)) 2.5 ((3N r + 87) + 7(22N r − 1005))κ 2 ⌈log 2 1/ǫ⌉ = √ 2c log 2 (200N r − 7344)(25N r − 918) 2.5 (157N r − 6948)κ 2 ⌈log 2 1/ǫ⌉ ≤ 2 20.46 log 2 (N r )N 3.5 r cκ 2 ⌈log 2 1/ǫ⌉.
In Table 3 , we give the complexities for several N r assuming ǫ = 1%. From Table 3 , we can see that Trivium is secure under quantum algebraic attack only if the condition number κ is large. 1, y, z) )B i (x + 2, y, z), for x = 0 or y = 0;
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for i = 1, . . . , N r , x, y = 0, . . . , 4, z = 0, . . . , w. In the preimage attack on Keccak, r(3y + x, x) and RC(z) are known constants, the first N b of A Nr (x, y, z) are the known Hash output, and A i (x, y, z) (i < N r ) and B i (x, y, z) are indeterminates. Thus we have n = 2bN r indeterminates and r = (2b − 1)N r + N h Boolean quadratic equations with total sparseness T = 401N r w + 101N h /25 − 101w. r b 3.5 cκ 2 ⌈log 2 1/ǫ⌉ with probability > 1 − ǫ, where κ is the condition number of F and c is the complexity constant of the HHL algorithm.
Proof. We have n = 2bN r , r = (2b − 1)N r + N h , and T = 401N r w + 101N h /25 − 101w. By Theorem 5.10, the complexity is
Setting N h = 224, 256, 384, 512, N r = 24, b = 1600 and ǫ = 1%, the complexities for various (N h , b, N r ) are given in Table 4 . From Table 4 The best known traditional attacks on Keccak were given in [34] and [24] . In [34] , practical collision attacks against the 5-round Keccak-224 and an instance of the 6-round Keccak collision challenge were given. In [24] , key recovery attacks were given for 4-to 8-round Keccak.
Quantum algebraic attack against MPKC
Multivariate Public Key Cryptosystem (MPKC) is one of the candidates for post-quantum cryptography [17] . An MPKC is generally constructed as follows
where L ∈ GL(m, F 2 ), R ∈ GL(n, F 2 ), and G : F n 2 → F m 2 is a quadratic map whose inversion can be efficiently computed. L and R are the secret keys and H is the public map. The direct algebraic attack against the MPKC is to solve the BMQ:
where X = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is the plaintext and Y = (y 1 , . . . , y r ) is the known ciphertext. Note that the BMQ in (17) are dense. We have
, there is a quantum algorithm to obtain a solution in time √ 2c(log 2 (n + (n 2 + 3n − 4)r/2) + 3)(n + (n 2 + 3n − 4)r/2) 2.5 (n + 7(n 2 + 3n − 4)r/2)κ 2 ⌈log 2 1/ǫ⌉ = O(n 7 r 3.5 κ 2 log 1/ǫ) with probability > 1 − ǫ, where κ is the condition number of F and c is the complexity constant of the HHL algorithm.
Proof. If F is a dense BMQ, T = (n + 1)(n + 2)r/2. By Theorem 5.10, we can find a solution of F = 0 in time √ 2c(log 2 (n + (n 2 + 3n − 4)r/2) + 3)(n + (n 2 + 3n − 4)r/2) 2.5 (n + 7(n 2 + 3n − 4)r/2)κ 2 ⌈log 2 1/ǫ⌉ = O(n 7 r 3.5 κ 2 log 1/ǫ).
Corollary 6.5. Suppose r = γn. Then there is a quantum algebraic attack against MPKC in time O(γn 10.5 κ 2 log 1/ǫ) with probability > 1 − ǫ, where κ is the condition number of (17) .
Related to this problem, the BMQ Challenge is to solve a given random BMQ with m = 2n or n = 1.5m over the finite fields F 2 , F 2 8 [37] . Considering the field
, where x ij and f ij denote the j-th bit of x i and f i . As a consequence, equation solving over F 2 8 has the same complexity as Boolean equation solving. For the BMQ challenge [37] , m = 2n or n = 1.5m implies the complexity is O(T 3.5 κ 2 log 1/ǫ) < O(n 10.5 κ 2 log 1/ǫ).
The best known deterministic algebraic algorithms to solve the BMQ are the Gröbner basis method [3] which has complexity O(2 0.841n ) under certain regularity condition for the equation system, and the multiplication free characteristic set method [20] which has bit complexity O(2 n ) for general BMQ. Although exponential in n, these methods had been used to solve BMQ from cryptanalysis with n = 128. Remark 6.6. From the above discussion, we can see that AES, Trivium, Keccak, and MPKC are secure under quantum algebraic attack only if the condition numbers of the related Boolean equation systems are large. This suggests that a possible new quantum criterion for cryptosystem design: the Boolean equation system of the cryptosystem has a large condition number.
Conclusion
We give two quantum algorithms to find the Boolean solutions of a polynomial system in C[X] and to solve Boolean equations in R 2 [X] in any given probability, whose complexities are polynomial in the number of variables, the total sparseness of the equation system, and the condition number of the equation system. As a consequence, we achieved exponential speedup for sparse Boolean equation solving if the condition number of the equation system is small.
The main idea of the algorithm is first reducing the problem of Boolean equation solving to the problem of finding the Boolean solutions of a polynomial system over C and then solving the Macaulay linear system of the polynomial system over C with the modified HHL algorithm to obtain the Boolean solutions based on the properties of quantum states.
The new quantum algorithm is used to give quantum algebraic attack against major cryptosystems AES, Trivium, and SHA-3/Keccak and show that these ciphers are secure under quantum algebraic attack only if the condition numbers of their equation systems are large. Similar results hold for MPKC, which is a candidate for post-quantum cryptosystems.
We also use the quantum algorithms to three famous problems from computational theory: the 3-SAT problem, the graph isomorphism problem, and the subset sum problem and show that the complexities to solve these problems are polynomial in the input size and the condition number of their corresponding equation system.
One of the major problems for future study is on the condition number: either to estimate the condition number of the cryptosystems and the 3-SAT problem, or to find new quantum method to solve Boolean systems, which has less relation with the condition number. It is also interesting to extend the method proposed in this paper to more general equation systems, such as equation solving over the finite fields [10] or the field of complex numbers.
Appendix. Equations for the AES S-Box
We list the 39 Boolean quadratic polynomials for the AES S-Box used in this paper.
x 5 x 7 + x 5 x 6 + x 3 x 7 + x 3 x 6 + x 2 x 4 + x 1 x 7 + x 1 x 6 + x 1 x 5 + x 1 x 3 + x 1 x 2 + x 0 x 7 + x 0 x 3 + x 0 x 2 + x 6 y 7 + x 7 y 6 + x 6 y 6 + x 7 y 5 + x 5 y 5 + x 7 y 4 + x 1 y 4 + x 2 y 3 + x 0 y 3 + x 6 y 2 + x 4 y 2 + x 3 y 2 + x 0 y 2 + x 4 y 0 + x 2 y 0 + x 7 + x 5 + x 3 + y 7 + y 2 + y 0 + 1, x 6 x 7 + x 5 x 7 + x 4 x 7 + x 4 x 6 + x 4 x 5 + x 3 x 4 + x 2 x 5 + x 1 x 7 + x 1 x 6 + x 1 x 5 + x 1 x 4 + x 1 x 3 + x 1 x 2 + x 0 x 5 + x 0 x 1 + x 6 y 6 + y 5 y 7 + x 3 y 4 + y 4 y 7 + y 4 y 5 + x 5 y 3 + x 0 y 3 + y 3 y 6 + y 3 y 4 + x 3 y 2 + x 0 y 2 + y 2 y 4 + y 2 y 3 + x 5 y 0 + x 3 y 0 + x 1 y 0 + y 0 y 7 + y 0 y 3 + y 0 y 1 + x 5 + x 3 + x 0 + y 2 + 1, x 1 y 7 +x 0 y 7 +y 6 y 7 +x 7 y 5 +x 6 y 5 +y 5 y 7 +x 7 y 4 +x 5 y 3 +x 2 y 3 +y 3 y 6 +x 2 y 2 +x 0 y 2 +y 2 y 5 +x 6 y 1 + x 4 y 1 +x 1 y 1 +y 1 y 2 +x 6 y 0 +x 5 y 0 +x 4 y 0 +y 0 y 7 +y 0 y 6 +y 0 y 5 +y 0 y 4 +y 0 y 3 +x 3 +x 1 +y 3 +y 2 +y 1 +1, x 6 x 7 + x 4 x 6 + x 3 x 7 + x 2 x 7 + x 1 x 4 + x 0 x 6 + x 0 x 3 + x 6 y 7 + x 4 y 7 + x 3 y 7 + x 7 y 6 + x 3 y 6 + x 7 y 5 + x 7 y 4 + x 1 y 4 + x 5 y 3 + x 4 y 3 + x 1 y 3 + x 6 y 2 + x 2 y 2 + x 6 y 1 + x 5 y 1 + x 3 y 1 + x 1 y 1 + x 0 y 1 + x 7 y 0 + x 6 y 0 + x 5 y 0 + x 3 y 0 + x 2 y 0 + x 1 y 0 + x 6 + x 1 , x 6 y 7 + x 5 y 7 + x 1 y 7 + x 0 y 7 + x 5 y 6 + x 4 y 6 + x 3 y 6 + x 4 y 4 + x 3 y 4 + x 2 y 4 + x 4 y 3 + x 3 y 3 + y 3 y 5 + x 2 y 2 + y 2 y 7 + y 2 y 4 + y 2 y 3 + x 7 y 1 + x 4 y 1 + x 3 y 1 + x 1 y 1 + y 1 y 7 + y 1 y 6 + y 1 y 5 + y 1 y 2 + x 7 y 0 + x 5 y 0 + x 4 y 0 + x 3 y 0 + y 0 y 4 + y 0 y 3 + y 0 y 2 + x 6 + x 4 + x 3 + y 2 , x 2 y 7 + y 5 y 6 + x 1 y 4 + x 7 y 3 + x 2 y 3 + x 1 y 3 + x 0 y 3 + y 3 y 6 + y 3 y 4 + x 4 y 2 + x 2 y 2 + x 0 y 2 + y 2 y 6 + y 2 y 5 + y 2 y 3 + x 5 y 1 + x 3 y 1 + y 1 y 7 + y 1 y 5 + y 1 y 4 + y 1 y 3 + y 1 y 2 + x 5 y 0 + x 4 y 0 + x 3 y 0 + x 0 y 0 + y 0 y 6 + y 0 y 1 + x 7 + x 6 + x 3 + x 2 + x 1 + y 4 + y 2 + y 1 + y 0 , x 5 y 7 + x 3 y 6 + x 2 y 6 + x 0 y 6 + x 6 y 5 + x 5 y 5 + x 0 y 5 + x 6 y 4 + x 5 y 4 + x 3 y 4 + x 2 y 4 + x 0 y 4 + y 4 y 7 + y 3 y 6 + y 3 y 5 + x 3 y 2 + x 2 y 2 + x 0 y 2 + y 2 y 7 + y 2 y 6 + y 2 y 5 + x 3 y 1 + x 2 y 1 + y 1 y 7 + y 1 y 6 + y 1 y 3 + x 5 y 0 + x 4 y 0 + x 1 y 0 + y 0 y 7 + y 0 y 2 + x 6 + x 1 + y 4 + y 3 + y 1 , x 6 y 7 + x 3 y 7 + x 0 y 7 + x 2 y 6 + x 4 y 4 + x 2 y 4 + x 0 y 4 + x 7 y 3 + x 6 y 3 + x 3 y 3 + x 2 y 3 + x 1 y 3 + x 0 y 3 + x 5 y 2 + x 2 y 2 + x 1 y 2 + x 3 y 1 + x 2 y 1 + x 1 y 1 + x 3 y 0 + x 6 + x 2 + x 1 + x 0 + y 2 , x 7 y 7 + x 4 y 7 + x 1 y 7 + x 7 y 6 + x 6 y 6 + x 1 y 6 + y 6 y 7 + x 7 y 5 + x 6 y 5 + x 2 y 5 + x 0 y 5 + x 6 y 4 + x 4 y 4 + x 2 y 4 + y 4 y 5 + x 4 y 3 + x 3 y 3 + x 2 y 3 + x 1 y 3 + x 0 y 3 + y 3 y 6 + y 3 y 5 + x 3 y 2 + y 2 y 4 + x 6 y 1 + x 5 y 1 + x 4 y 1 + y 1 y 5 + y 1 y 2 + x 6 y 0 + x 2 y 0 + x 1 y 0 + y 0 y 6 + y 4 + y 3 , x 4 y 7 + x 3 y 7 + x 4 y 6 + x 2 y 6 + x 1 y 6 + x 0 y 4 + x 3 y 3 + x 1 y 3 + x 0 y 3 + x 7 y 2 + x 3 y 2 + x 2 y 2 + x 1 y 2 + x 0 y 2 + x 7 y 1 + x 6 y 1 + x 5 y 1 + x 4 y 1 + x 3 y 1 + x 0 y 1 + x 4 + x 2 + x 1 + y 2 , x 3 x 6 + x 2 x 5 + x 1 x 4 + x 1 x 2 + x 0 x 4 + x 0 x 1 + x 4 y 6 + x 2 y 6 + x 1 y 6 + x 7 y 5 + x 7 y 4 + x 2 y 4 + x 6 y 3 + x 4 y 3 + x 3 y 3 + x 2 y 3 + x 7 y 2 + x 0 y 2 + x 4 y 1 + x 3 y 1 + x 5 y 0 + x 2 y 0 + x 1 y 0 + x 4 + x 1 + y 4 + y 3 + y 0 + 1, x 4 x 7 + x 2 x 3 + x 1 x 5 + x 1 x 4 + x 0 x 7 + x 0 x 6 + x 0 x 5 + x 0 x 4 + x 0 x 1 + x 7 y 7 + x 4 y 7 + x 1 y 6 + x 2 y 4 + x 1 y 4 + x 0 y 4 + x 7 y 3 + x 4 y 3 + x 3 y 3 + x 4 y 2 + x 3 y 2 + x 0 y 2 + x 7 y 1 + x 5 y 1 + x 2 y 1 + x 1 y 1 + x 0 y 1 + x 1 y 0 + x 0 y 0 + x 7 + x 1 + x 0 + y 2 , x 6 x 7 + x 4 x 5 + x 3 x 7 + x 3 x 5 + x 2 x 5 + x 2 x 4 + x 2 x 3 + x 1 x 7 + x 0 x 6 + x 0 x 4 + x 2 y 7 + x 0 y 7 + x 1 y 6 + x 6 y 5 + x 2 y 4 + x 6 y 3 + x 5 y 3 + x 2 y 3 + x 6 y 2 + x 4 y 2 + x 3 y 2 + x 2 y 2 + x 1 y 2 + x 7 y 1 + x 5 y 1 + x 6 y 0 + x 5 y 0 + x 4 y 0 + x 3 y 0 + x 0 y 0 , x 5 x 7 + x 3 x 6 + x 1 x 7 + x 1 x 2 + x 0 x 4 + x 0 x 3 + x 1 y 7 + x 2 y 6 + x 1 y 6 + x 6 y 5 + x 4 y 5 + x 2 y 5 + x 0 y 4 + x 5 y 3 + x 2 y 3 + x 6 y 2 + x 5 y 2 + x 1 y 2 + x 0 y 2 + x 7 y 1 + x 6 y 0 + x 5 y 0 + x 0 y 0 + x 6 + x 1 + y 6 + y 2 + y 1 , x 1 y 7 + x 0 y 7 + x 2 y 6 + x 6 y 5 + x 2 y 5 + x 4 y 4 + x 3 y 4 + x 2 y 4 + x 1 y 4 + x 0 y 4 + x 5 y 3 + x 2 y 3 + x 1 y 3 + x 7 y 2 + x 4 y 2 + x 3 y 2 + x 1 y 2 + x 6 y 1 + x 3 y 1 + x 2 y 1 + x 1 y 1 + x 0 y 1 + x 5 y 0 + x 0 y 0 + x 3 + y 2 ,
x 5 x 7 + x 3 x 6 + x 1 x 7 + x 1 x 2 + x 0 x 4 + x 0 x 3 + x 6 y 7 + x 3 y 7 + x 0 y 7 + x 4 y 6 + x 5 y 5 + x 2 y 5 + x 4 y 4 + x 3 y 3 + x 1 y 2 + x 0 y 2 + x 7 y 1 + x 5 y 1 + x 4 y 1 + x 2 y 1 + x 7 y 0 + x 6 y 0 + x 1 y 0 + x 6 + x 5 + x 4 + x 2 + x 0 + y 7 , x 7 y 7 + x 7 y 6 + x 6 y 6 + x 4 y 6 + x 2 y 6 + x 1 y 6 + x 7 y 5 + x 2 y 5 + x 7 y 4 + x 1 y 4 + x 0 y 4 + y 4 y 6 + x 7 y 3 + x 3 y 3 + y 3 y 5 + y 3 y 4 + x 7 y 2 + x 4 y 2 + x 3 y 2 + y 2 y 4 + y 2 y 3 + y 1 y 6 + x 3 y 0 + x 2 y 0 + x 1 y 0 + y 0 y 6 + y 0 y 4 + y 0 y 2 + y 0 y 1 + x 5 + x 4 + x 3 + x 1 + y 4 + y 2 + y 1 , x 7 y 6 + y 6 y 7 + x 7 y 5 + x 3 y 5 + y 5 y 7 + x 7 y 4 + x 0 y 4 + y 4 y 7 + y 4 y 5 + x 6 y 3 + x 4 y 3 + x 3 y 3 + x 1 y 3 + y 3 y 7 + y 3 y 6 + y 3 y 5 + y 3 y 4 + x 6 y 2 + x 5 y 2 + x 4 y 2 + x 1 y 2 + x 0 y 2 + y 2 y 5 + x 6 y 1 + x 5 y 1 + x 4 y 1 + x 0 y 1 + y 1 y 7 + y 1 y 4 + y 1 y 2 + x 5 y 0 + x 4 y 0 + y 0 y 7 + y 0 y 5 + y 0 y 4 + x 0 + y 0 , x 6 y 6 + x 1 y 6 + x 5 y 5 + x 3 y 4 + x 0 y 4 + x 7 y 3 + x 6 y 3 + x 5 y 3 + x 1 y 3 + x 0 y 3 + x 7 y 2 + x 7 y 1 + x 6 y 1 + x 4 y 1 + x 3 y 1 + x 0 y 1 + x 4 y 0 + x 2 y 0 + x 7 + x 6 + x 4 + x 3 + x 0 + y 2 , x 6 x 7 +x 5 x 7 +x 4 x 6 +x 3 x 7 +x 2 x 7 +x 2 x 5 +x 1 x 7 +x 0 x 6 +x 0 x 1 +x 7 y 7 +x 3 y 7 +x 1 y 7 +x 5 y 6 +x 0 y 4 + x 6 y 3 +x 1 y 3 +x 7 y 2 +x 6 y 2 +x 5 y 2 +x 4 y 2 +x 3 y 2 +x 4 y 1 +x 2 y 1 +x 5 y 0 +x 3 y 0 +x 5 +x 2 +x 1 +x 0 +y 3 +y 2 , x 0 y 7 + x 2 y 6 + x 0 y 6 + x 5 y 5 + x 0 y 5 + x 6 y 4 + x 3 y 4 + x 2 y 4 + x 0 y 4 + x 7 y 3 + x 6 y 3 + x 4 y 3 + x 3 y 3 + x 2 y 3 + x 4 y 2 + x 3 y 2 + x 4 y 1 + x 2 y 1 + x 7 y 0 + x 2 y 0 + x 0 y 0 + x 7 + x 4 + x 2 + x 1 + y 4 + y 1 + y 0 , x 5 x 7 +x 5 x 6 +x 4 x 6 +x 3 x 5 +x 2 x 6 +x 2 x 5 +x 1 x 7 +x 1 x 6 +x 0 x 7 +x 0 x 6 +x 0 x 3 +x 0 x 1 +x 6 y 7 +x 3 y 6 + x 3 y 4 +x 0 y 4 +x 7 y 3 +x 4 y 3 +x 3 y 3 +x 5 y 2 +x 4 y 2 +x 6 y 1 +x 4 y 1 +x 2 y 1 +x 1 y 1 +x 1 y 0 +x 5 +x 0 +y 4 +y 2 ,
x 5 x 7 + x 5 x 6 + x 3 x 7 + x 3 x 4 + x 2 x 6 + x 2 x 4 + x 1 x 4 + x 1 x 3 + x 1 x 2 + x 0 x 6 + x 7 y 7 + x 6 y 7 + x 4 y 7 + x 3 y 7 + x 1 y 6 + x 1 y 4 + x 7 y 3 + x 3 y 3 + x 2 y 3 + x 6 y 2 + x 2 y 2 + x 0 y 2 + x 7 y 1 + x 5 y 1 + x 4 y 1 + x 3 y 1 + x 6 y 0 + x 3 y 0 + x 1 y 0 + x 6 + x 3 + x 2 + y 4 ,
x 5 x 7 + x 4 x 6 + x 4 x 5 + x 3 x 5 + x 2 x 7 + x 2 x 4 + x 2 x 3 + x 0 x 4 + x 0 x 1 + x 4 y 6 + x 2 y 6 + x 7 y 5 + x 7 y 4 + x 6 y 4 + x 1 y 4 + x 6 y 3 + x 5 y 3 + x 2 y 3 + x 1 y 3 + x 7 y 2 + x 5 y 2 + x 7 y 1 + x 6 y 1 + x 0 y 1 + x 4 y 0 + x 3 y 0 + x 1 y 0 + x 3 + x 1 + y 4 + y 3 ,
x 5 x 7 + x 4 x 6 + x 3 x 7 + x 3 x 5 + x 3 x 4 + x 2 x 4 + x 1 x 6 + x 1 x 3 + x 1 x 2 + x 0 x 7 + x 4 y 7 + x 3 y 7 + x 0 y 7 + x 4 y 6 + x 2 y 6 + x 0 y 6 + x 5 y 5 + x 0 y 5 + x 6 y 4 + x 6 y 3 + x 6 y 2 + x 4 y 2 + x 3 y 2 + x 1 y 2 + x 5 y 1 + x 4 y 1 + x 5 y 0 + x 1 y 0 + x 0 y 0 + x 7 + x 5 + y 1 + y 0 , x 6 x 7 +x 4 x 6 +x 4 x 5 +x 2 x 6 +x 2 x 5 +x 2 x 3 +x 1 x 7 +x 1 x 5 +x 1 x 4 +x 1 x 3 +x 0 x 2 +x 1 y 7 +x 2 y 6 +x 1 y 6 + x 6 y 5 +x 2 y 5 +x 2 y 4 +x 3 y 3 +x 7 y 2 +x 3 y 2 +x 2 y 2 +x 7 y 1 +x 5 y 1 +x 1 y 1 +x 7 +x 3 +x 0 +y 6 +y 4 +y 2 +y 1 , x 7 y 5 + x 7 y 4 + x 2 y 4 + x 7 y 3 + x 6 y 3 + x 0 y 3 + x 5 y 2 + x 4 y 2 + x 0 y 2 + x 7 y 1 + x 3 y 1 + x 2 y 1 + x 0 y 1 + x 7 y 0 + x 5 y 0 + x 4 y 0 + x 2 y 0 + x 1 y 0 + x 2 + x 1 + x 0 + y 4 + y 2 + y 1 + 1, x 5 x 6 + x 3 x 7 + x 3 x 6 + x 2 x 5 + x 2 x 4 + x 1 x 6 + x 1 x 5 + x 1 x 4 + x 1 x 3 + x 1 x 2 + x 0 x 7 + x 0 x 2 + x 0 x 1 + x 5 y 7 + x 1 y 6 + x 4 y 4 + x 2 y 4 + x 0 y 4 + x 5 y 3 + x 4 y 3 + x 1 y 3 + x 0 y 2 + x 5 y 1 + x 2 y 1 + x 1 y 1 + x 3 y 0 + x 0 y 0 + x 6 + x 5 + x 1 + y 3 + y 2 , x 6 y 7 + x 3 y 7 + x 1 y 7 + x 6 y 6 + x 5 y 6 + x 1 y 6 + x 5 y 5 + x 1 y 5 + x 6 y 4 + x 6 y 3 + x 5 y 3 + x 4 y 3 + x 3 y 2 + x 7 y 1 + x 6 y 1 + x 1 y 1 + x 6 y 0 + x 3 y 0 + x 2 y 0 + x 5 + y 7 + y 3 + y 2 + y 1 + y 0 , x 5 x 6 + x 4 x 6 + x 3 x 6 + x 3 x 5 + x 3 x 4 + x 1 x 7 + x 1 x 5 + x 0 x 3 + x 0 x 2 + x 5 y 7 + x 1 y 6 + x 6 y 5 + x 2 y 5 + x 2 y 4 + x 0 y 4 + x 6 y 2 + x 4 y 2 + x 2 y 2 + x 1 y 2 + x 6 y 1 + x 5 y 1 + x 4 y 1 + x 2 y 1 + x 5 y 0 + x 3 y 0 + x 7 + x 6 + x 4 + x 0 + y 6 + y 4 + y 2 + 1, x 5 y 7 + x 4 y 7 + x 3 y 7 + x 1 y 7 + x 0 y 7 + x 7 y 6 + x 4 y 6 + x 7 y 5 + x 3 y 5 + x 7 y 4 + x 4 y 4 + x 3 y 4 + x 7 y 3 + x 6 y 3 + x 4 y 3 + x 3 y 3 + x 1 y 3 + x 6 y 2 + x 5 y 2 + x 2 y 2 + x 2 y 1 + x 7 y 0 + x 3 y 0 + x 2 y 0 + x 1 y 0 + y 6 + y 2 + y 0 , x 7 y 7 + x 4 y 7 + x 1 y 7 + x 6 y 6 + x 5 y 6 + x 5 y 5 + x 2 y 3 + x 1 y 3 + x 0 y 3 + x 5 y 2 + x 4 y 2 + x 2 y 2 + x 1 y 2 + x 7 y 1 + x 0 y 1 + x 6 y 0 + x 5 y 0 + x 4 y 0 + x 0 y 0 + x 6 + x 2 + x 1 + x 0 + y 7 , x 7 y 7 + x 4 y 7 + x 2 y 7 + x 4 y 6 + x 6 y 5 + x 5 y 5 + x 1 y 5 + x 6 y 4 + x 4 y 4 + x 7 y 3 + x 6 y 3 + x 6 y 2 + x 5 y 2 + x 0 y 2 + x 6 y 1 + x 2 y 1 + x 6 y 0 + x 4 y 0 + x 5 + x 4 + x 3 + x 1 + x 0 + y 7 + y 4 + y 2 , x 4 x 6 + x 4 x 5 + x 3 x 5 + x 3 x 4 + x 2 x 7 + x 2 x 6 + x 2 x 4 + x 2 x 3 + x 1 x 6 + x 1 x 5 + x 1 x 4 + x 1 x 2 + x 0 x 7 + x 0 x 6 + x 0 x 2 + x 0 x 1 + x 0 y 5 + x 6 y 4 + x 3 y 4 + x 0 y 4 + x 6 y 3 + x 3 y 3 + x 2 y 3 + x 6 y 2 + x 5 y 2 + x 4 y 2 + x 0 y 2 + x 7 y 1 + x 5 y 1 + x 0 y 0 + x 7 + y 1 + 1, x 6 y 7 + y 6 y 7 + x 7 y 5 + y 5 y 7 + x 7 y 4 + y 4 y 7 + x 7 y 3 + x 6 y 3 + x 2 y 3 + x 1 y 3 + y 3 y 5 + y 3 y 4 + x 7 y 2 + x 6 y 2 + x 0 y 2 + y 2 y 3 + x 4 y 1 + x 3 y 1 + x 2 y 1 + x 1 y 1 + x 0 y 1 + y 1 y 5 + y 1 y 2 + x 7 y 0 + x 1 y 0 + y 0 y 7 + y 0 y 6 + y 0 y 3 + y 0 y 1 + x 2 + y 5 + y 4 , x 4 y 7 + x 3 y 7 + x 1 y 7 + x 5 y 6 + x 4 y 6 + x 1 y 6 + x 4 y 5 + x 0 y 5 + x 7 y 4 + x 6 y 4 + x 4 y 4 + x 2 y 4 + x 1 y 4 + x 5 y 3 + x 4 y 3 + x 3 y 3 + x 0 y 3 + x 3 y 2 + x 0 y 1 + x 6 y 0 + x 1 y 0 + x 6 + x 4 + x 2 + y 6 + y 2 + y 1 , x 5 x 7 +x 4 x 7 +x 2 x 5 +x 2 x 3 +x 1 x 7 +x 1 x 5 +x 0 x 7 +x 0 x 6 +x 0 x 5 +x 0 x 4 +x 0 x 3 +x 4 y 5 +x 6 y 4 +x 5 y 3 + x 4 y 3 +x 0 y 3 +x 7 y 2 +x 3 y 2 +x 2 y 2 +x 5 y 1 +x 3 y 1 +x 0 y 1 +x 5 y 0 +x 3 y 0 +x 0 y 0 +x 7 +x 5 +x 1 +x 0 +y 4 +y 0 +1, x 7 y 7 + x 4 y 7 + x 0 y 7 + x 6 y 6 + x 5 y 6 + x 0 y 6 + x 0 y 5 + x 6 y 4 + x 5 y 4 + x 3 y 4 + x 7 y 3 + x 6 y 3 + x 0 y 3 + x 7 y 2 + x 3 y 2 + x 2 y 2 + x 6 y 1 + x 3 y 1 + x 1 y 1 + x 5 y 0 + x 4 y 0 + x 3 y 0 + x 1 y 0 + x 3 + y 3 ,
x 4 x 5 +x 3 x 7 +x 3 x 6 +x 3 x 4 +x 2 x 7 +x 2 x 5 +x 2 x 3 +x 1 x 6 +x 1 x 4 +x 1 x 3 +x 0 x 7 +x 1 y 7 +x 2 y 6 +x 1 y 6 + x 6 y 5 +x 2 y 5 +x 4 y 4 +x 3 y 4 +x 7 y 3 +x 3 y 2 +x 5 y 1 +x 2 y 1 +x 0 y 1 +x 4 y 0 +x 3 y 0 +x 0 y 0 +x 3 +y 3 +y 2 +y 1 +y 0 .
